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Friedman v. Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 75 (Nov. 23, 2011)1
FAMILY LAW - CHILD CUSTODY
Summary
The Court considered a petition for mandamus or prohibition to stop family court from
asserting jurisdiction in interstate child custody dispute.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court granted the petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus, directing the
family court to discontinue its assertion of jurisdiction and to dismiss the case unless the “home
state” of California declined to exercise jurisdiction. The (UCCJEA) forms the exclusive basis
for determining subject matter jurisdiction in interstate child custody disputes in Nevada.
Divorced parents’ agreement that Nevada would have exclusive jurisdiction does not trump the
UCCJEA. Instead, the Nevada court must defer to the children’s “home state,” as determined
under UCCJEA. Nevada courts will have jurisdiction only if the “home state” declines to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that Nevada is a more appropriate or convenient forum.

Factual and Procedural History
Daniel Friedman (“Friedman”) and Kevyn Wynn (“Wynn”) divorced in Nevada in
November 2008. The divorce decree ordered joint legal custody (and under certain conditions,
joint physical custody) of their three children. Although both parents contemplated moving out
of state, they included an agreement in the decree that the children’s “home state” would be
Nevada for the purpose of all future child custody disputes. Further, the decree expressed the
parents’ intent that Nevada have exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes. Both parents
eventually relocated to California, where they were to share joint physical custody of the
children.
In August 2010, after the parents failed to settle on a joint custody schedule, Wynn
applied to the Eighth Judicial District Court (Family Court) in Nevada for an order awarding her
primary physical custody of the children. Friedman opposed the motion and challenged the
Nevada court’s jurisdiction. He initiated alternate custody proceedings in California.
The Nevada district court rejected the father’s argument that it did not have subject
matter jurisdiction and awarded the mother primary physical custody. The district court found
that the parents and children resided in California for at least eleven months and recognized that
under the UCCJEA this suggested Nevada did not have jurisdiction. The district court
nonetheless found the parents’ forum agreement controlling. The district court further held the
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father was judicially estopped to deny jurisdiction. The father petitioned the Court for writs of
prohibition or mandamus to prohibit the district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction.
Discussion
Justice Pickering wrote for the Court, sitting en banc. Justices Cherry and Gibbons
separately dissented.
Nevada (like every state except Massachusetts) adopted the UCCJEA to address issues
that arise in interstate child custody proceedings, including jurisdictional disputes.2 The
UCCJEA is the “exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination” in
Nevada.3 In cases where jurisdictional facts are undisputed, subject matter jurisdiction4 under
the UCCJEA is a question of law and subject to de novo review.5 However, the review should
consider decisions from other states to harmonize and “promote uniformity of the law . . . among
states that enact [the UCCJEA].”6
It was undisputed that Nevada had jurisdiction over the initial child custody
determination when the court entered the divorce decree in 2008. This would normally give it
“exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” over child custody determinations.8 However, such
jurisdiction ends when “[a] court of this state or another state determines that the child [or] the
child’s parents . . . do not presently reside in this state.”9 The district court made such a
determination when it found that the parties resided in California, thereby ending its jurisdiction.
After its “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” ends, a court may modify its prior child
custody determination “only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination” under NRS
§ 125A.305.10 Under 125A.305, “a [Nevada court] has jurisdiction to make an initial child
custody determination only if [Nevada] is the home state of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding” or “a court of the home state of the child has declined to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that [Nevada] is a more appropriate forum . . . .”12
Under the UCCJEA, “home state” means “[t]he state in which a child lived with a parent
. . . for at least 6 consecutive months . . . immediately before the commencement of a child
custody proceeding.”13 The court found, and Wynn conceded, that when Wynn filed her motion
in August 2010, California was the children’s “home state” under the UCCJEA.
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The Court, consistent with the courts of other states, dismissed the idea that
“commencement of the proceeding” in NRS section 125A.305 could mean the original divorce
proceeding. Construing the phrase in this way “would confer perpetual jurisdiction over matters
of custody to the courts of the state which granted dissolution,” without regard to continued
contact with the state and in conflict with the UCCJEA’s goals.14 Accordingly, the relevant
proceeding was the instant motion to modify custody.
Since the father initiated child custody proceedings in California, the Nevada court was
required to “stay its proceeding[,]communicate with the [California] court[, and if the California
court] does not determine that [Nevada] is a more appropriate forum, . . . dismiss the
proceeding.”15
Under the UCCJEA, a court may consider several factors to determine whether another
state’s court is a more appropriate forum. One of the factors is whether the parties have an
agreement “as to which state should assume jurisdiction.”17 Therefore, a court could consider
the parents’ agreement when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction. However, the Court
emphasized this determination was California’s to make. In this, the Nevada district court got it
“precisely backward” when it asserted jurisdiction and determined that California could ask it for
deference.
The Court also dismissed Wynn’s argument that, under Vaile v. Dist. Ct.,18 Friedman was
judicially or equitably estopped from contesting Nevada’s jurisdiction. A court that lacks subject
matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA cannot acquire it by estoppel.19 Vaile is consistent with
this case because while the court judicially estopped a wife from contesting jurisdiction in a
divorce proceeding, the court denied jurisdiction by estoppel in the child custody issues, finding
them governed by the UCCJA (the precursor to the UCCJEA). Wynn may argue to the
California court, in the context of asking it to decline jurisdiction, that she detrimentally relied on
Friedman’s agreement to abide by the agreement. However that argument has no bearing on the
Nevada district court’s jurisdiction.
The Court may issue a writ of prohibition to halt “the proceedings of any tribunal . . .
when such proceedings are . . . in excess of the jurisdiction of the tribunal.”21 It may issue a writ
of mandamus “to compel the performance of an act”22 when “there is not a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”23 Since the district court’s assertion of
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction exceeded its authority, and since it failed to stay its
proceedings in deference to the home state of California, extraordinary writs were justified to
promote comity and the jurisdictional goals of the UCCJEA.
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Dissents
Justice Gibbons dissented, believing that extraordinary writs were unwarranted because
California had not yet decided to exercise jurisdiction, and may yet decline to do so in light of
the parties’ prior agreement that Nevada have exclusive jurisdiction. Justice Cherry joined
Justice Gibbons’ dissent and added that he believed the Court should examine the law to find
“fair and just exceptions to the loss of jurisdiction when both parents have stipulated to Nevada
having exclusive jurisdiction over all child custody matters.”
Conclusion
An agreement in a divorce decree selecting Nevada as the forum state for deciding
interstate child custody disputes is ineffective when it conflicts with the UCCJEA. A court with
jurisdiction over the dispute – that is, a court in the child’s “home state” – may consider such an
agreement as one of several factors when determining whether another state would be a more
appropriate or convenient forum, but is not bound by it.

